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BREAKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK: 
LESSONS FROM DELIBERATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
RON LEVY∗ 
[This work provides comparative insights into how deliberation on proposed constitutional 
amendments might be more effectively pursued. It reports on a new nationwide survey of public 
attitudes to constitutional reform, examining the potential in Australia of innovative Canadian 
models of reform led by Citizens’ Assemblies. Assembly members are selected at random and are 
demographically representative of the wider public. They deliberate over reforms for several months 
while receiving instruction from experts in relevant fields. Members thus become ‘public-experts’: 
citizens who stand in for the wider public but are versed in constitutional fundamentals. The author 
finds striking empirical evidence that, if applied in the Australian context, public trust would be 
substantially greater for Citizens’ Assemblies compared with traditional processes of change. The 
article sets these results in context, reading the Assemblies against theories of deliberative democ-
racy and public trust. One reason for greater public trust in the Assemblies’ may be an ability to 
accommodate key values that are otherwise in conflict: majoritarian democratic legitimacy, on the 
one hand, and fair and well-informed (or ‘deliberatively rational’) decision-making, on the other. 
Previously, almost no other poll had asked exactly how much Australians trust in constitutional 
change. However, by resolving trust into a set of discrete public values, the polling and analysis in 
this work provide evidence that constitutional reform might only succeed when it expresses, at once, 
the values of both majoritarian and deliberative democracy.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N:  DE A D L O C K,  RE F O R M  A N D  LE G I T I M A C Y 
The Commonwealth’s track record of limited constitutional change has seen 
much debate over whether Australia is, constitutionally speaking, a ‘frozen 
continent’.1 In over 40 attempted referenda to amend the Commonwealth 
Constitution since 1901, only eight have succeeded. It is now more than three 
decades since the last successful attempt, in 1977. In 1995, Professor Brian 
Galligan identified the oppositional tactics of the federal parliamentary political 
parties as the ‘first and foremost’ of three reasons for negative referendum 
results, and also concluded that it was ‘probably unrealistic’ to expect this to 
change.2 However, following the failure of the four bicentennial referenda of 
1988 and the republic referendum of 1999, other leading commentators in 
politics and law have described Australia’s track record in constitutional delib-
eration as moving from bad to worse.3 According to Saunders, the ‘highly 
adversarial character of most debate on constitutional change’ has reflected a 
distinct problem: ‘the failure of successive Parliaments and governments 
adequately to adapt [political] practices developed in the context of representa-
tive government to the quite different demands of the referendum.’4  
This article revisits the problem of constitutional reform but brings to bear a 
set of perspectives often absent from legal scholarship. Literature on public trust 
in governance is burgeoning across the disciplines of political theory, philosophy 
and sociology.5 Yet academic lawyers and constitutional policymakers generally 
overlook, and therefore still poorly recognise, the important roles that trust plays 
in constitutional reform. In recent years, renewed pressure for constitutional 
reform has arisen on issues that include Australian federalism, constitutional 
recognition of local government, electoral reform, civil rights protection, 
Indigenous recognition and, again, the republic.6 But such objectives are unlikely 
 
 1 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne University Press, 1967) 206. 
 2 Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia’s Constitutional System of Government 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995) 128–31. 
 3 See, eg, John Uhr, ‘After the Referendum: The Future of Constitutional Change’ (2000) 11 
Public Law Review 7; Helen Irving, ‘Reflection Depicts a Portrait of Long Ago’, The Australian 
(Sydney), 11 April 2001, 13. 
 4 Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Parliament as Partner: A Century of Constitutional Review’ (Research 
Paper No 3, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2000) ii. 
 5 See, eg, Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust and Governance (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1998); Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Antitrust’ (1986) 96 Ethics 231; Piotr Sztompka, 
Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
 6 See, eg, A J Brown, ‘Federalism, Regionalism and the Reshaping of Australian Governance’, in 
A J Brown and J A Bellamy (eds), Federalism and Regionalism in Australia: New Approaches, 
New Institutions? (ANU E Press, 2007) 11. See also Robert Carling, ‘Fixing Australian 
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to see significant progress without renewal of the constitutional change process 
in a way that addresses how constitutional deadlock is rooted in broader trends 
concerning public trust in authority. This article begins the process of extending 
the interdisciplinary literature on trust into the field of constitutional reform. 
Viewing constitutional change through the lens of trust reveals much about the 
scope and contours of stalled reform.7 Like most lawmaking, amending the 
constitutional text is an elaborately complex undertaking. It requires particularist 
expertise that is generally beyond the capacities of voters unschooled in the 
Constitution. However, in tension with this requirement, constitutional change 
also uniquely demands that an outsized role be played by citizens. This robust 
requirement of democratic legitimacy is a mainstay of liberal constitutional 
theory and is formalised in Australia in s 128 of the Constitution, which provides 
for public referenda to ratify (or deny) any change. Yet, despite the holding of 
referenda, proposed changes have in the main been imposed from above. 
Constitutional reform processes have traditionally entrusted the preparations for 
referenda — that is, initiating, writing and advocating for and against reforms — 
primarily to elites in government. The empirical literature on trust suggests that, 
under the institutional status quo, Australians will only continue to resist 
constitutional change. Like citizens of other liberal democracies, the trust that 
Australians have been willing to invest in governments has markedly declined 
since the 1960s.8 Trends suggest that there will be a continuing period of 
sharpening critical scrutiny of and distrust in government elites — predicting, in 
turn, a deepening crisis for constitutional reform. 
While Australia was one of the first nations to institutionalise a referendum 
model for constitutional amendment,9 others followed suit and experienced 
 
Federalism’ (2008) 24(1) Policy 30; Anne Twomey, ‘Reforming Australia’s Federal System’ 
(2008) 36 Federal Law Review 57; George Williams, ‘Thawing the Frozen Continent’ (2008) 19 
Griffith Review 11, 26–31; Commonwealth, Australia 2020 Summit: Final Report (2008) ch 9. 
 7 The problem of distrust in the amendment process is interlaced with other causes of low 
referendum support, including partisanship, ignorance, apathy, state opposition, leader 
personalities, anti-elitism and status quo conservatism: Brian Galligan, ‘The 1988 Referendums 
and Australia’s Record on Constitutional Change’ (1990) 43 Parliamentary Affairs 497, 500–1; 
Saunders, above n 4; Sawer, above n 1; George Winterton, ‘A Directly Elected President: 
Maximising Benefits and Minimising Risks’ (2001) 3 University of Notre Dame Australia Law 
Review 27, 27; Williams, above n 6, 17–18; Helen Irving, ‘The Republic Referendum of 6 
November 1999’ (2000) 35 Australian Journal of Political Science 111, 112–13; L F Crisp, 
Australian National Government (Longman Cheshire, 5th ed, 1983) 51; Clive Bean, ‘Political 
Personalities and Voting in the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum’ (2002) 14 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 459; Ian McAllister, ‘Elections Without Cues: 
The 1999 Australian Republic Referendum’ (2001) 36 Australian Journal of Political Science 
247, 255–63. 
 8 See, eg, Ian McAllister and Juliet Clark, Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the 
Australian Election Study, 1987–2007 (2008) 25; Bruce Tranter and Zlatko Skrbiš, ‘Trust and 
Confidence: A Study of Young Queenslanders’ (2009) 44 Australian Journal of Political Science 
659, 668–9; Pippa Norris (ed), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government 
(Oxford University Press, 1999). Cf Clive Bean, ‘Is There a Crisis of Trust in Australia?’ in 
Shaun Wilson et al (eds), Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report (UNSW Press, 2005) 122. 
 9 Australia was second, after Switzerland in 1848: Bruno Kaufmann and M Dane Waters, Direct 
Democracy in Europe (Carolina Academic Press, 2004) 188. 
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similar obstacles.10 More than Australia, however, foreign jurisdictions have also 
employed intriguing variations on the referendum model, recognising that 
referenda alone are blunt and frequently ineffective tools for constitutional 
reform. Some recent foreign institutional experiments have the potential to 
address the problem of reforms that falter not on their merits, but due primarily 
to the general posture of voter distrust in authority. Among these are the innova-
tions of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic bodies potentially 
accommodate key values that are otherwise in conflict: majoritarian democratic 
legitimacy, on the one hand, and fair and well-informed — or ‘deliberatively 
rational’ — decision-making, on the other. 
This work aims to provide Australian legal and public policy debates with 
comparative insights into how deliberation on proposed constitutional reform 
might be more effectively pursued. International experiments in deliberative 
constitutional change present lessons that, if adapted to the Australian context, 
may help restart overdue reforms. Two recent Canadian experiments in delibera-
tive democracy provide important variations on experience by creating the 
‘Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform’ in the Provinces of British Columbia 
in 2004 and Ontario in 2007. The Assemblies created what I call ‘public-
experts’: citizen decision-makers who bridge the distance between majoritarian 
democratic legitimacy and deliberatively rational constitutional reform. Citizens’ 
Assemblies (‘CAs’) serve in effect as constitutional juries. They are small, 
representative cross-sections of the voting public constituted by a random lottery. 
Once chosen, CA members are instructed by experts over an extended period, 
ideally on a discrete question of constitutional reform.11 They subsequently vote 
for a proposed amendment amid extensive debate. But a CA goes no further than 
recommending a constitutional amendment and presenting the arguments in its 
favour. At the end of the amendment process the general voting public has the 
final say in a referendum and gives (or denies) assent to the change. The CA 
model was especially effective in British Columbia — a jurisdiction character-
ised by political populism and polarisation,12 and a potential analogue to 
Australia. 
Comparative analysis of the Canadian provincial experience and Australian 
conditions, then, points to new opportunities for trusted processes of deliberative, 
citizen-led constitutional reform.13 Yet a number of questions remain open. 
Would Australians respond to deliberative options as favourably as did voters in 
British Columbia, who gave an enviable 57.7 per cent endorsement to their CA 
 
 10 See Michael Lusztig ‘Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives Are 
Doomed to Fail’ (1994) 27 Canadian Journal of Political Science 747. See also Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European 
Union’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603. 
 11 See Gordon F Gibson, Report on the Constitution of the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform 
(2002). 
 12 Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse, ‘Introduction’ in Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds), 
Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 1, 7. 
 13 Between December 2008 and January 2009, I met with over 20 former leaders of and 
participants in the Ontario and British Columbia CAs for this work. 
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process? Are the CAs transferable to Australian political culture? Would the 
public-expert model bypass the problem of distrust in constitutional lawmaking 
imposed from on high? Or might Australians perceive the new body as an 
attempt at constitutional sleight of hand — as just another band of elite and 
unaccountable decision-makers, distant from and unaware of the daily concerns 
of voters? The public-expert may be a novel and potentially workable category 
of decision-maker, a paradox incapable of assisting with the search for a better 
process, or something in between. 
Outlined in theory in Parts II and III of this article, the potential for CAs to 
address the crisis of trust in Australian constitutional reform will at first remain 
speculative. This initial focus on theory yields to empirical evaluation in Part IV, 
where I report results from a nationwide opinion poll. The critical test for 
deliberative innovations in Australia may be whether they can attract the 
subjective trust of voters. A series of questions put to Australian voters inquired 
for the first time into the constitutional values that processes of change must 
accommodate in order to be likely to gain voter trust. What is clear from a long 
record of previous polls is that trust is in decline, and the need to find innovative 
solutions that enhance democracy in the preparatory process of referenda is 
essential. But beyond this there is much still open to question, and almost no 
other poll has asked exactly how Australians trust in constitutional change.14 
Using a combination of questions about real experience and hypothetical 
scenarios, the poll determines not only whether Australians trust in decision-
makers of constitution change, but whether they trust them in specific ways. The 
study therefore adds essential content to what has previously remained a limited 
data set about public trust in relation to referenda. 
While past public trust opinion polling leaves the notion of trust itself largely 
undefined, the poll reported in this article fills a wide and surprising lacuna in 
our current understanding of public trust in constitutional change. In scholarship 
on constitutional reform there remains a need for such accounts, which if 
sufficiently fine-grained, can help us recognise how — and how much — models 
of change can accommodate multiple democratic values. Indeed, by resolving 
trust into a set of discrete public values, the poll results provide tentative 
evidence that the process of constitutional reform might only succeed when it 
expresses, at once, the values of both majoritarian and deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy, in some form, appears to be not just another piece in the 
 
 14 See Bruce Tranter, ‘The Australian Constitutional Referendum of 1999: Evaluating Explanations 
of Republican Voting’ (2003) 22 Electoral Studies 677; Australian Demographic and Social 
Research Institute, Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (10 March 2010) The Australian Survey 
of Social Attitudes <http://aussa.anu.edu.au/index.php>. The only Australian exception appears 
to be McAllister, above n 7, 259–60. The Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey, which 
McAllister co-led in 1999, asked a broad question about trust, as well as a more specific one — 
whether voters thought politicians were ‘in touch with ordinary voters’ — a variant of which is a 
question asked in the present work. In Canada, on the occasion of the CA-led referendum in 
2004, a detailed and helpful poll of British Columbians gauged perceptions of trust: see Fred 
Cutler et al, ‘Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly as 
Agenda Setter’ in Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds), Designing Deliberative Democracy: 
The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 166. 
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toolkit of institutional design, but an emerging condition precedent, enforced by 
voters, of politically persuasive constitutional reform in Australia. 
I I   DE L I B E R AT I V E  DE M O C R A C Y A N D  CO N S T I T U T I O N A L CH A N G E 
A  Deliberative Democracy and CAs 
A longstanding insight holds that there is no best way to model institutions to 
guarantee democratic legitimacy.15 Institutional designs choose from a buffet of 
democratic values. For example, in the House of Representatives, individual 
voter equality is supreme, while the Senate pays greater heed to the equality of 
regions: every state, big or small, receives the same allotment of senators. And of 
course some, but not all, democratic systems employ bills of rights to temper the 
voices of majorities. Yet against such wide normative variety, deliberative 
democracy does not merely offer more options. Instead, it partially sidesteps the 
compromises between values that usually characterise democratic design. This 
Part considers these and other benefits (and limits) of deliberative democratic 
constitutional change, both in the abstract and using the illustration of the CAs in 
Parts I(A) and B. Parts I(C) and D then identify two competing theories of what 
legitimate constitutional change means in terms of institutional design, contrast-
ing deliberative approaches with relatively unmediated, laissez-faire citizen 
participation. Part III will then add further colour to these discussions by 
examining theories of deliberative constitutional reform through the lens of 
scholarship on trust. 
Deliberative democracy emerged relatively recently as a discrete field, gaining 
momentum in the late 1990s and again after the Canadian CA experiments of 
2004–07. Like many political ideas, however, the first suggestions arose much 
earlier and indeed have roots in antiquity. Deliberative democracy uses creative 
institutional design to attempt to transcend political polarisation and partisanship 
without sacrificing democratic legitimacy. A deliberative decision-making 
process re-routes democratic governance through generally longer and more 
complex paths. Deliberative democracy is more time-consuming than traditional 
democratic forms; but that is its point. Deliberative democratic governance 
embraces a more widely-varied set of inputs, drawing from public participants 
more robustly than is the traditional norm. Running democracy through a more 
elaborate deliberative course is a strategy to encourage participants to consider 
policy options not from pre-formed factional or ideological positions, but with 
greater attention to perspectives other than their own. While no institution can 
guarantee its members will assume an enlarged and flexible view of their own 
and others’ interests, deliberative democratic bodies at least leave open this 
possibility by putting decision-makers in the position to learn from and cooper-
ate with each other. The bodies therefore typically include representation from 
 
 15 See Kenneth J Arrow, ‘A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare’ (1950) 58 The Journal of 
Political Economy 328. 
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broad social cross-sections.16 Often as well, some form of participation or 
leadership by experts in a relevant field is essential. Much of the time spent 
therefore enhances participant exposure — both to other citizen-participants in a 
demographically diverse group and to specialist information.17 
In 2004, British Columbia began a particularly creative and intriguing experi-
ment with its world-first CA, which focused on choosing an electoral system. 
The CA was a constitutional convention comprising one academic chair and 160 
lay citizens, chosen in part to reflect the Province’s demographic diversity.18 
Elections BC, an independent regulator, distributed more than 23 000 letters to 
citizens across the Province, based on a random draw from electoral rolls.19 1715 
recipients sent back replies indicating a wish to take part.20 From this group, a 
draw from a hat selected 158 citizens to participate — one man and one woman 
from each of the Province’s electoral divisions.21 The selection was ‘stratified’ 
rather than wholly random, however, as CA membership was designed to reflect 
the Province’s diversity of regional, age and gender populations.22 Later the 
legislature topped up the initial roster to include two indigenous members.23 
The CA met on weekends over a period of eleven months, in three phases. 
First, in a ‘Learning Phase’, political scientists from the Province, as well as one 
from New Zealand and another from the United Kingdom, instructed members 
on the range of electoral models at work around the globe.24 Delegates from 
across the Province assembled, at public expense, for six sessions at the Wosk 
Centre for Dialogue, a grand circular assembly hall in Vancouver.25 At the 
sessions, experts put to work teaching strategies common in modern universities: 
interactive participation, a dedicated website, assigned readings and structured 
group work overseen by graduate students.26 This phase also saw the establish-
ment, by agreement among delegates, of ‘shared values’ for mutually cooperative 
engagement throughout the three phases.27 
 
 16 See, eg, Dennis F Thompson, ‘Who Should Govern Who Governs? The Role of Citizens in 
Reforming the Electoral System’ in Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds), Designing 
Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 20, 42. 
 17 See Hilary Pearse, ‘Institutional Design and Citizen Deliberation’ in Mark E Warren and Hilary 
Pearse (eds), Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 70. 
 18 British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, Making Every Vote Count: The Case 
for Electoral Reform in British Columbia, Final Report (2004) 10 (‘CA Final Report’). 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 Ibid. 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 Warren and Pearse note that the random selection process incidentally yielded a diverse spread of 
ethnic, educational and occupational identities — including, for example, members born in 15 
countries and speaking several languages. Nevertheless, ‘owing to the element of self-selection’ 
the CA skewed somewhat toward white, older and more extensively educated membership: 
Warren and Pearse, ‘Introduction’, above n 12, 10. 
 24 CA Final Report, above n 18, 11. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Ibid. See also below n 92 and accompanying text on the values enumerated. 
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Second, in the ‘Public Hearings Phase’, the CA took submissions, either by 
writing or in person, at one of 50 public sessions across the Province.28 Several 
CA delegates attended each session, interacting in total with some 3000 people.29 
Public perspectives were intended to help inform the next and final phase, the 
‘Deliberation Phase’.30 Deliberations were themselves phased and structured, 
initially around discussion of the broad values (eg, fairness) that should inform 
the provincial electoral system, and later around implementing these values in 
the particular options tabled (eg, ‘mixed member proportionality’ and ‘single 
transferable vote’).31  
The winning proposal was a home-grown variant of the single transferable 
vote, which became known as ‘BC-STV’. Delegates voted, by near-consensus, 
first to establish government by proportional representation in the Province, and 
thereafter to recommend BC-STV in particular.32 BC-STV also went to a 
Province-wide referendum for ratification. With 57.7 per cent of the broader 
public in favour of the recommendation, the level of support received was 
enviable by Australian standards — yet it fell short of the Province’s 60 per cent 
supermajority requirement (‘arguably set excessively high’33) to pass the 
recommendation into law.34 
After the British Columbian experiment and a similar one in Ontario, the 
Netherlands followed suit with a large-scale CA,35 marking the start of move-
ments to bring the CA model to new matters and locations.36 Legislators in 
California and the United Kingdom also later urged the adoption of CAs.37 
Elsewhere, new variations have been non-governmental, including ‘America 
Speaks’ in the United States, and a four-day ‘Citizen’s Parliament’ held at Old 
Parliament House in Canberra,38 neither of which were directly empowered to 
 
 28 CA Final Report, above n 18, 12. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 Ibid 13. 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Ibid. The votes were 142:11 and 146:7 respectively. 
 33 Thompson, above n 16, 39. 
 34 British Columbia also required the proposal to pass by simple majorities in at least 60 per cent of 
electorates. It passed in 97 per cent of electorates: Elections BC, Statement of Votes: Referendum 
on Electoral Reform (2005) 9–12. Subsequent votes in Ontario in 2007, and again in British 
Columbia in 2009, gained simple majorities in only 37 per cent and 39 per cent of electorates 
respectively: Elections Ontario, Referendum Statistical Results (2007); Elections BC, Statement 
of Votes: Referendum on Electoral Reform (2009) 17–20 (‘BC Statement of Votes 2009’). In 
Ontario, lacklustre public education probably played a key role in the referendum defeat; unlike 
the norm in Australia, no ‘pro and con’ booklets were issued. In British Columbia, the second 
vote took place without a new CA process, such that any educative and trust benefits from a 
contemporaneous CA were absent: see BC Statement of Votes 2009, above n 34, 1. 
 35 See Matthew Flinders and Dion Curry, ‘Deliberative Democracy, Elite Politics and Electoral 
Reform’ (2008) 29 Policy Studies 371, 374–5. 
 36 See Ian Ward, ‘An Experiment in Political Communication: The British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly on Electoral Reform’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Political Science 301, 302. 
 37 See California Assembly Bill ACA 28; Constitutional Renewal Bill 2009 (UK). See also 
discussion in ibid. 
 38 See John Dryzek, ‘The Australian Citizens’ Parliament: A World First’ (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Senate, Canberra, 24 April 2009) <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/pops/pop51/ 
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write a referendum question like their Canadian forerunners. (The CA recom-
mendations in Canada went straight to referenda, without further modification by 
elected elites.) Prime Minister Rudd offered appreciation (but little more) to 
participants, and the Citizens’ Parliament had at best a minimal impact on 
subsequent lawmaking.39 Results are therefore mixed so far. Yet efforts to perfect 
the form should continue, and at a minimum must invest resources into lengthier 
deliberation and widespread publicity and public engagement, and authority to 
translate recommendations directly into further action. 
If adequately resourced and empowered, governance by CAs represents an 
intriguing new addition to the canon of deliberative design.40 A deliberative 
process ideally transforms its lay participants into public-experts well-versed in 
the concerns of other citizens and on the matters at issue, such as specific options 
for constitutional change. This in turn can create a cadre of citizens able to take 
the lead in shaping decisions of public significance. The role for elected repre-
sentatives correspondingly diminishes. Deliberative democracy is a strategy to 
leave behind many of the approaches to governance offered by partisan parlia-
mentary democracy. Most importantly, it offers a way around the widely-
criticised but seemingly intractable party system, and an alternative to the 
dominant ‘distrust model’ of democratic design, which focuses on checking 
power and dividing it between mutually antagonistic factions.41 The potential to 
transcend the usual narrow constructions of binary and oppositional political 
choices — in policy landscapes that are complex and pluralistic — is a key 
reason behind deliberative democracy’s expanding appeal. 
B  Deliberative Democratic Conditions 
Deliberative democracy improves in several respects on the distrust model of 
institutional design. The distrust and deliberative models have distinctive 
mechanics. The distrust model functions by promoting competition and antago-
nism among actors in government. This is the dominant approach of Australian 
and most other parliamentary democracies. Laws directly prohibit excessive 
concentrations of power, or detail elaborate sanctions against extra-
constitutional, corrupt and other illegal, unethical or incompetent governance. 
Institutions also proliferate to prevent or prosecute abuses. The distrust model 
therefore features an in-built wariness and elevates a truism about the corruptibil-
 
dryzek.htm>. Dryzek notes that an ‘Online Parliament’ convened in the months preceding in-
person meetings: at 2. 
 39 Dryzek above n 38, 7. 
 40 The British Columbia CA had a budget of CAD$5.5 million: Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform, How Is the Assembly Funded? (2003) 
<http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/inaction/ 
faqs/2003/11/dmaclachlan-3_0311140852-154>. 
 41 The modern intellectual history of this model draws from authors such as Hume, Hobbes and the 
American Federalists: see David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford University Press, 
first published 1739, 2000 ed); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin, first published 1651, 1968 
ed); James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Penguin, first 
published 1788, 1987 ed). The model goes by many labels, of which ‘distrust’ is one: see, eg, 
Geoffrey R Stone, ‘Autonomy and Distrust’ (1993) 64 University of Colorado Law Review 1171. 
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ity of power to a comprehensive political philosophy. The American constitu-
tional founders, for example, sharpened the rather vague divisions of power 
inherited from the British parliamentary model, and repositioned the separate 
branches to interpenetrate and block each other at every turn. Beyond these basic 
methods, a host of more particular distrust model constraints later flourished. 
Auditors-general and Ombudsmen are key modern examples that are now mostly 
understood as salutary. There are many other, more controversial modern 
examples. Independent prosecutors investigate the corruption of incumbent 
governments, coming under fire themselves for exceeding their briefs.42 Finan-
cial bonuses provide incentives for government whistle-blowers.43 And ‘biparti-
san’ electoral commissions attempt to secure electoral fairness through partisan 
negotiation.44  
At root, the distinction between deliberative and distrust model institutions is 
their degree of reliance on competition among decision-makers on the one hand, 
and cooperation on the other. In theory and at least sometimes in practice, 
deliberative decision-making design is not primarily competitive but rather 
cooperative.45 This distinction turns in part on how the deliberative and distrust 
models orchestrate the stages of decision-making. Any decision-making process 
has stages of deliberation, during which the actors involved sift and evaluate 
information and ideas, and stages of determination, when a decision solidifies 
and formalises. Distrust model decision-makers are more likely to draw upon 
their own knowledge and analysis from start to finish — throughout both 
deliberation and determination. For example, in a decision-making committee, 
an individual parliamentarian, or members of a faction, might consider the 
benefits of substantially reshaping electoral rules without input from other 
people or factions.46 Others must eventually enter into the process, but only at 
the determination stage, at which point factions often must negotiate, unless a 
majority can force its preferred result.47 
One way of looking at the design of deliberative democratic institutions is as a 
series of attempts to delay the point where deliberation solidifies into determina-
 
 42 See Julie O’Sullivan, ‘The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy’ (1996) 33 
American Criminal Law Review 463. 
 43 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan and Terry Morehead Dworkin, ‘Do Good and Get Rich: Financial 
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act’ (1992) 37 Villanova Law Review 273. 
 44 For example, three Democrats and three Republicans govern the United States Federal Elections 
Commission: Gerard J Clark and Steven B Lichtman, ‘The Finger in the Dike: Campaign 
Finance Regulation after McConnell’ (2006) 39 Suffolk University Law Review 629, 656. 
 45 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press, 1996) 52–
5. 
 46 See, eg, ibid 4. 
 47 We should not let generality sweep away nuance. The question for institutional designers should 
not be whether a political system employs a competitive or a cooperative strategy; both are 
always required. We cannot have collective action without cooperation, and eradicating the 
competitive spirit in political actors is an unrealistic goal. Many new proposals assume that it is 
appropriate only to program ever more distrust and competition into all steps of decision-making. 
But this assumption overlooks the rich range of alternative, cooperative options that deliberative 
democrats identify. The question for institutional design should be how to structure decision-
making to encourage cooperation at some levels and competition at others. 
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tion.48 Deliberative decision-making encourages decision-makers to interact 
throughout by cooperating, building on ideas in concert with others. Participants 
should therefore remain open to each other’s influence as near as possible to the 
point of final determination.49 The principal benefit of delaying the point of 
determination is the so-called corporate resource of many heads: the breadth of 
relevant information and cogent reasoning that more people bring to a decision-
making problem.50 Under deliberative models, many people contribute prior to a 
decision’s final determination, each bringing a distinct point of view and perhaps 
constructing a more useful result.51 This contrasts with the distrust model, whose 
foremost reason for adopting multi-member bodies is the potential to stifle 
corruption and abuse, as individual members feel the gaze of others upon them.52 
What, however, is a useful decision? How is the corporate intelligence of 
individuals who are open to influence and persuasion by others better than the 
distrust model’s more atomised deliberations? Deliberative democratic institu-
tions are distinguished by their encouragement of a particular form of rationality 
in public decision-making. On the one hand, like all bona fide democratic 
institutions, which manifest a range of public preferences and interests, delibera-
tive democratic bodies insist on democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, within 
the bounds of this constraint, a system can pursue democracy in more or less 
deliberatively rational ways. The precise contours of deliberative rationality are 
open to debate and refinement; however, with some simplification, there are two 
main deliberative democratic conditions: information and fairness. 
1 Information 
Decision-making can be hobbled by ‘incomplete understanding’ in the face of 
complexity,53 or ‘too little information’.54 Adequate information helps make 
decision-making more responsive to the problems it means to solve. In particu-
lar, deliberative democratic institutions accommodate multi-step reasoning. They 
recognise that problems addressed by government are exceedingly complex.55 
Solutions may not fit within the artificially few poles of debate constructed by 
 
 48 See, eg, Pearse, who notes that British Columbia CA members ‘avoided explicitly declaring their 
personal preference for a particular electoral system until late in the deliberation phase’: Pearse, 
above n 17, 73. 
 49 In Habermas’ theoretical categorisation of ‘strategic’ versus ‘communicative’ action, individuals 
pursuing strategic action try to maximise their assumed self-interest, while individuals acting 
communicatively remain open to reconsidering what is in their own interests: Jürgen Habermas, 
The Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy trans, Beacon Press, 1984) vol 1, 285–
6 [trans of: Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, Band I, Handlungsrationalität und 
gesellschaftiliche Rationalisierung (first published 1981)]. 
 50 See, eg, Adrian Vermeule, ‘Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory’ (2009) 1 Journal of Legal 
Analysis 1. 
 51 Thompson above n 16, 26–7. 
 52 See, eg, Madison, Hamilton and Jay, above n 41, 311; Steven G Calabresi and Kevin H Rhodes, 
‘The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law 
Review 1155, 1156. 
 53 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, above n 45, 43. 
 54 John Uhr, ‘The Constitutional Convention and Deliberative Democracy’ (1998) 21 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 875, 879. 
 55 See Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, above n 45, 358–9. 
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simpler competitive discourses. While still a senator, Barack Obama described 
one of the frustrations of writing policy into law: 
What every senator understands is that while it’s easy to make a vote on a com-
plicated piece of legislation look evil and depraved in a thirty-second television 
commercial, it’s very hard to explain the wisdom of that same vote in less than 
twenty minutes.56 
This point is key in decision-making. How we model a process — either 
simplifying issues or attending to them in their full complexity — determines 
whether government can ever deal satisfactorily with questions up for determina-
tion.57 
There will always, of course, be differences of opinion. Competition among 
ideas is inexorable and useful. But when decision-makers deliberate, cooperation 
also becomes essential. Cooperative reasoning helps construct the complex ideas 
that public governance requires. Pith and brevity elude us in describing impor-
tant legal reforms, which tend to emerge from weighing diverse details and 
abstractions. For example, we might describe the reasons behind a tax cut, in one 
or two steps, as giving people more money to spend and potentially stimulating 
economic activity. But the rationales for a new carbon tax and green technology 
fund, for example, rely on long chains of probabilistic causation. Warnings of 
climate change and its catastrophic economic costs must cover several scientific 
and economic steps. A green fund might ultimately retool the economy and offer 
its own economic stimulus over the long term, but selling the sacrifices involved 
to a voting public takes a great deal of effort. Complexity is similarly a feature of 
constitutional change, only more so. Any change that tweaks the constitutional 
order sends effects up and down the legal system. For instance, new proposed 
rules of selection for an independent Australian head of state would occupy the 
visible tip of an iceberg. The consequences of the new rules for Westminster-
model government and Australian national identity would occupy the iceberg’s 
far greater fraction.58 
Competitive procedures are usually more about winning arguments than about 
reaching outcomes that respond to policy realities.59 Competition focuses 
foremost on allegiance — on securing a political win for factions to which 
various decision-makers belong. Factions may have narrowly defined aims. They 
may aim to win battles in Parliament in order to record a victory over opponents. 
They may hope to build political capital and momentum by appearing as the 
more competent and successful alliance in politics. Or they may intend to score 
victories for an ideology that defines the faction, but that, from within the 
straitjacket of competitive decision-making, members of the faction may lack the 
 
 56 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (Crown 
Publishers, 2006) 132. Similarly, the Australian social critic Donald Horne cites the political 
habit of ‘casting up simple shapes to explain complex events’: Donald Horne, Death of the Lucky 
Country (Penguin Books, 1976) 55. 
 57 See also Warren and Pearse, ‘Introduction’, above n 12, 6. 
 58 See, eg, Winterton, above n 7. 
 59 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, above n 45, 360. 
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freedom to reconsider or refine. Outright competition is reactive and narrow in 
its scope.60 It is generally not open to opposing views, and even less to re-
conceiving decision-making as other than a binary opposition. But the issues 
facing government seldom arrange naturally around factional polarities. Refer-
ences to ‘ideological balance’ are pervasive in academic and popular thinking,61 
but ideological balance is an intellectual red herring of institutional design. There 
is little reason to assume that arguments for or against a policy will commonly, 
or ever, balance out evenly. Nevertheless, many new institutional models 
premised on distrust and competition continue to accommodate (and construct) a 
double-sided or ‘bipartisan’ notion of decision-making.62  
The trouble with competitive decision-making models, then, is their bias in 
favour of simple over complex solutions. The simplification imposed by compe-
tition can place a drag on effective public decision-making. Economics, the 
environment, the Constitution, and much else, require governments to act based 
on thorough pictures of the policy landscape. In the practical terms of institu-
tional design, this means, for a start, that decision-makers must not work in 
solitude. Complex action realistically requires the cooperation of many hands. If 
issues up for determination are in actuality complex, then so too should be the 
deliberations that address them. Cooperative decision-making on the deliberative 
model may help to construct decisions based on more complex, and thus more 
realistic, arrays of policy factors. 
2 Fairness 
The second criterion of deliberative democracy concerns fairness as between 
people or groups subject to public authority. This is a more clearly normative 
dimension to deliberative decision-making. A recurring suggestion is that 
relatively cooperative decision-making can be sensitive to interests beyond those 
of merely an elite or limited selection of people. Thompson reasons that impor-
tant public decisions ‘affect all citizens’ and therefore each citizen should ‘have a 
voice in the decision … [and] each should consider the views of other citizens 
when making the decision.’63 Most modern strands of deliberative democracy 
scholarship build on the very old idea that just judgments in law or politics 
require leaders to exercise the moral creativity to place themselves in the shoes 
of others. Thus, for example, Rawls relied on the construct of decision-makers 
alive to the interests of the disparate groups of a society but blind to their own.64 
 
 60 Ibid 128–9. 
 61 See, eg, Daniel W Gingerich, ‘Corruption, Ideology, and the Returns to Democracy’ (Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 3–6 
September 2009). 
 62 The distrust model reflects scepticism about the potential for decision-makers to be fair. It 
therefore balances partisan authorities against each other in hopes of achieving an approximation 
of fairness. See, eg, the bipartisan appointment model proposed in the 1999 referendum on a 
republican head of state: Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic) Bill 1999 (Cth) s 
60. 
 63 Thompson, above n 16, 26. 
 64 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press, 1972). 
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A host of antecedent writers relied on their own related metaphors.65 For 
deliberative democracy these insights become problems of institutional design. 
The question is how to build on such ethical intuitions by operationalising them 
in governance. 
Another way of putting the distinction between the distrust and deliberative 
models, then, is that the latter is meant to be more fair. Deliberative decisions are 
defined in part by what they are not: they are not driven by partisan or other 
selfish interests, such as the political party affiliation or personal social position 
of decision-makers. Neither, more controversially, do decision-makers bow to a 
pre-committed ideological position. But if impartial decision-making is not 
selfish, it must be something else. Fairness, defined positively, means that a 
decision-maker gives, in Uhr’s words, ‘due consideration [to] the issues, which 
means appropriately weighing all relevant matters before arriving at a deci-
sion.’66 
Some reasonable doubt surrounds this notion. Can decision-makers adequately 
deliver on promises of fairness cast not only in simple negative terms, but also in 
the markedly more pluralistic positive sense? Such concerns are illusory in at 
least some cases. Fairness as ‘due consideration’ refers not to a deterministic 
guarantee of a decision that is substantively correct, but only to a process by 
which decision-makers maintain fidelity to the key issues bearing on the deci-
sion. This is a more manageable expectation. The Canadian CAs themselves 
provide good examples. Tasked with recommending new public voting systems, 
these bodies first canvassed practical and theoretical arguments for and against 
electoral systems now in use globally. The British Columbian CA ultimately 
recommended a ‘single-transferable vote’, while the Ontario CA recommended 
‘mixed-member proportional’ representation.67 The bodies came to different 
conclusions and recommended two quite different electoral systems, and yet by 
most accounts both were substantially fair throughout.68 Fairness can be a matter 
not of reaching a correct final answer, but rather, more modestly, of openness to 
a relevant set of concerns and reasons.69 
Finally, taking a wide view of the impacts of a decision includes taking the 
long view over a number of years.70 This is one important reason why delibera-
tive decision-making can be preferable to competitive decision-making, which 
tends to focus on the immediate self-interest of political factions. The wisdom of 
taking the long view is uncontroversial in the abstract, yet too infrequently 
 
 65 See, eg, Kant’s categorical imperative, with echoes of the golden rule: Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas K Abbot trans, Broadview Editions, 2005) 
[trans of: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (first published 1785)]. 
 66 Uhr, above n 54, 879 (describing the ‘core of effective deliberation’). 
 67 CA Final Report, above n 18, 1; Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, One Ballot, 
Two Votes: A New Way to Vote in Ontario (2007) 1. 
 68 See, eg, the contributions to Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds), Designing Deliberative 
Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 69 I expand on this notion of fairness in Ron Levy, ‘Drawing Boundaries: Election Law Fairness 
and Its Democratic Consequences’ in Joo-Cheong Tham, Brian Costar and Graeme Orr (eds), 
Electoral Democracy: Australian Prospects (Melbourne University Press, 2011) 57. 
 70 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, above n 45, 210. 
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informs institutional design. Processes with little scope for addressing long-term 
consequences are the rule. A recent example is the difficulty the Commonwealth 
Parliament had in trying to pass a climate change mitigation bill in 2009–10.71 
Environmental issues often illustrate both the difficulty of collective action under 
traditional democratic models and the tendency to neglect concerns of intergen-
erational equity, elevating the interests of people alive today over those who will 
come later. Constitutional change is also a paradigmatic case, given that such 
change is definitionally long-lasting. A constitutional rule established delibera-
tively, however, is ideally in part a product of decision-makers placing them-
selves in the position of those who will inherit their decisions in the future. 
C  Deliberative Democracy and Accommodation 
A basic critique asserts that deliberative democracy improperly intervenes in 
the democratic process.72 A more democratically legitimate system would then 
be a laissez-faire approach of minimal external and legal control over democ-
racy. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, may reply to this critique by 
deploying the argument of ‘baselines’ familiar from economic and legal con-
texts.73 There is always some level of state intervention already shaping social 
decision-making, rather than the legal vacuum assumed by proponents of laissez-
faire governance. All institutions, deliberative or otherwise, leave their mark on 
the outcomes of decision-making and skew the results achieved. For example, as 
we saw, polarising institutions bias simple over complex policy. Indeed, all 
public governance channels decision-making through an assortment of assem-
blies, jurisdictional divisions or discrete phases. And, because each and every 
system of governance therefore features its own elaborate gauntlets of institu-
tions and laws, the notion of unfettered politics is nearly always a fiction. 
Therefore, all other things being equal from the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy, we should choose to intervene in the democratic process in ways that 
also fulfil informational and fairness values. 
Deliberative democracy attracts its share of critics who, for example, question 
the premise that deliberative democratic institutions confer as much democratic 
legitimacy as traditional models. Indeed from Aristotle, who was perhaps the 
first to theorise deliberation, to Burke, J S Mill and the American authors of the 
Federalist Papers, deliberation was long pictured as an elite imposition on, and 
necessary departure from, its opposite number, democracy.74 Modern critiques 
 
 71 See Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2010 (Cth). 
 72 See Thompson, above n 16, 33–4. 
 73 See, eg, arguments to the effect that ‘government constructs the private market through property 
and contract law’ so that what some have ‘championed as laissez faire [has] turned out on closer 
inspection to be merely a different form of public meddling with so-called private affairs’: 
Barbara H Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and 
Economics Movement (Harvard University Press, 1998) 212. 
 74 See, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton university 
Press, 2004) 8–9. 
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continue to challenge deliberative democracy as under-inclusive.75 This Part 
highlights other theories responding that deliberative democracy potentially 
manifests three democratic values — democratic legitimacy and the two delib-
erative conditions of information and fairness — not only as well as, but indeed 
more completely than, rival models. Deliberative democracy can sometimes 
resolve tensions between the values, rather than merely striking balances. We 
may therefore call deliberative democracy an ‘accommodative’ solution. The 
pursuit of accommodation is an explicit or implied focus of energies in recent 
literature on democratic legitimacy and fairness.76 
This Part develops three facets of the argument that, by bypassing the value 
trade-offs that beset traditional democratic design, deliberative democratic 
institutions offer uniquely appealing models of constitutional change. These 
notes on the benefits in theory of deliberative democracy will provide context for 
opinion polling data on the subjective public appeal of deliberative innovations 
considered later in this article. 
1 Deliberative Correction 
For normal lawmaking — that is, lawmaking not directly related to constitu-
tional amendment — deliberative democracy can be preferable to traditional 
models because it does not wait for the conclusion of lawmaking before bringing 
fairness and informational concerns to bear. Every liberal democracy, including 
Australia, imposes what we might call ‘deliberative corrections’ on the excesses 
of popular rule. In normal lawmaking, it is usually judges who discipline 
democratic excesses. They issue corrections for fairness, for example, to 
safeguard the rights of inclusion of minorities in political life.77 And they impose 
a comparatively well-informed, rationalist perspective, prohibiting some forms 
of arbitrary lawmaking and poorly-tailored laws.78 On traditional models of 
democracy, then, judges often impose their own versions of deliberative rational-
ity — of informed inquiry based on notions of fairness. But judges generally 
bring deliberative correction to laws that have already been enacted. This is a key 
 
 75 Some point to uneven influence in deliberative democracy by groups at different positions in the 
social hierarchy: see, eg, James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and 
Democracy (MIT Press, 1996) 107; Lynn M Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’ (1997) 25 Political 
Theory 347; Iris Marion Young, ‘Justice, Inclusion and Deliberative Democracy’ in Stephen 
Macedo (ed), Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 151. Another line of argument cites non-deliberative modes of reasoning, such as 
political party or class ‘indoctrination’, as necessary and legitimate in a democracy: see, eg, 
Michael Walzer, ‘Deliberation, and What Else?’ in Stephen Macedo (ed), Deliberative Politics: 
Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) 58. 
 76 See, eg, Peter W Hogg and Allison A Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75; Horacio Spector, ‘The Right to a Constitutional Jury’ (2009) 3 
Legisprudence 111; Eric Ghosh, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty: Considering Constitutional Juries’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 327. 
 77 See, eg, Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, which concerned a prisoner’s 
right to vote. 
 78 Australian constitutional law is replete with tests for proportionate treatment (fairness by another 
name) from Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 to modern implied 
rights jurisprudence, for example in ibid. 
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difference in form. Deliberative democracy potentially safeguards fairness in the 
course of decision-making, which is often a more democratically legitimate 
option than the post hoc fix of judicial review. 
Applying deliberative corrections in course first means that corrections are 
persuasive rather than coercive. Judicial review of normal lawmaking uses norms 
of constitutional fairness to strike down otherwise validly enacted legislation. 
Deliberative democracy can lead to similar substantive outcomes, but sees 
diverse segments of the voting public, along with expert participants (eg, the 
political scientists of the CAs), help shape the development of positions in 
dialogue throughout decision-making. Because fairness informs rather than 
overrules democratic choices, fairness and democratic legitimacy may be in less 
conflict than under traditional models. Indeed, many of the so-called dialogic 
theories that have colonised constitutional rights theory are appreciated for their 
similar accommodative benefits. Courts and legislatures are pictured as locked in 
long-term conversations over rights. According to Hogg and Bushell’s influential 
restatement, legislatures do not yield but rather respond to judges, and ‘[w]here a 
judicial decision striking down a law on [rights] grounds can be reversed, 
modified, or avoided by a new law, any concern about the legitimacy of judicial 
review is greatly diminished’.79 However, unlike judicial review, in deliberative 
democratic decision-making the dialogue may be real — a face-to-face conversa-
tion sustained over time — rather than merely metaphoric, or at best impersonal, 
episodic and coerced.80 
A corollary benefit is that improving deliberative rationality in a democratic 
process early on can bypass conflicts of rights. In traditional models, a top-down 
judicial fiat issues only after positions have solidified during lawmaking. Fully-
formed rights clash when a judge invalidates a law (to which supporters may be 
deeply committed) only after the law’s final enactment. Thus, on the traditional 
approach, majoritarian democracy and legal provisions for fairness (eg, minority 
rights safeguarded in a constitution) are at odds.81 Usually one must yield to the 
other. In contrast, deliberative approaches encourage majoritarian democracy 
itself to take account of fairness concerns and potentially therefore to head off 
clashes between rights. Encouraging deliberative rationality in course rather than 
post hoc might bring citizens’ democratic preferences closer to norms of fairness 
throughout the process of decision-making. Deliberative democracy is partly 
therefore a trick of timing; it ensures that diverse public interests interact at 
earlier cooperative stages rather than conflicting at later competitive ones. It may 
therefore alter preferences when they are still plastic rather than putting rights in 
conflict (or indeed infringing rights) by negating finalised preferences later on. 
 
 79 Hogg and Bushell, above n 76, 80. The authors add that, in contrast, the traditional conception of 
judicial review as justifiably working against democratic rights is ‘hollow and unsatisfactory’: 
at 76–7. See also Leighton McDonald, ‘Rights, “Dialogue” and Democratic Objections to 
Judicial Review’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 1. 
 80 On most views, coercion is incompatible with deliberative democracy: see, eg, Bohman, 
above n 75, 25–47. Under an entrenched bill of rights, judges, more than legislatures, dictate the 
terms of the dialogue and determine how much leeway their interlocutors have to respond. 
 81 See generally Ghosh, above n 76; Hogg and Bushnell, above n 76. 
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Finally, looking beyond normal politics to the politics of s 128, what forms of 
deliberative correction should feature in processes of constitutional amendment? 
Judicial review usually provides corrections for normal politics. However, unlike 
some other jurisdictions,82 in Australia substantive judicial review of constitu-
tional referendum results is unavailable. Formal constitutional change is there-
fore an area of lawmaking largely free of deliberative correction — arguably a 
regrettable circumstance given the outsized importance of constitutional law-
making. Yet while post hoc judicial correction might be better than no correction 
at all, deliberative democracy applied in the course of decision-making is in any 
case preferable. The CA reform model, for example, could bring deliberative 
correction to bear on constitutional change in Australia, not merely in the flawed 
manner of judicial review, but more robustly through deliberative democracy. 
2 Public Preference 
In the tradition of Rousseau,83 some authors understand the people as properly 
unrestrained in their constitutive power to write the constitution.84 These 
perspectives are wary of corrections to democracy. In a number of respects, 
however, deliberative democracy expands rather than limits democracy by 
righting the democratic failures of governments left relatively unregulated. 
Similar arguments on this alternative line are familiar in the field of electoral 
law. John Hart Ely’s influential notion of ‘representation reinforcement’ views 
minority political rights as necessary fixes helping healthy democracies to 
prevent exclusions of discrete voter blocs.85 This view conceives of minority 
political rights not only as rights of fairness benefiting their bearers, but also as 
rights making democracy itself effective.86 Thus, to the extent that deliberative 
democracy secures greater fairness in democratic processes, it may be more 
democratically legitimate than traditional models. 
Deliberative democracy theories also challenge the presumed tension between 
rational expertise and public influence in decision-making. The coherence of this 
tension is indeed too often overestimated. Rational and well-informed decision-
making are not valuable in and of themselves; they are rather prerequisites to 
seeing public preferences through to fruition in policy-making. This position 
reflects the Humean notion that ‘[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
 
 82 For example, Californian citizen-initiated referendum results, such as Proposition 8, which 
outlawed same-sex marriage in 2009, are subject to review under constitutional equality 
protections: California Constitution art I § 7.5. See John Gildersleeve, ‘Editing Direct 
Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of Ballot Initiatives Offend the First 
Amendment?’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 1437; Perry v Schwarzenegger, 704 F Supp 2d 
921 (ND Cal, 2010). 
 83 ‘There is not, nor can there be, any kind of fundamental law that is obligatory for the body of the 
people, not even the social contract’: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract 
(Judith R Masters trans, St Martin’s Press, 1978) 54 [trans of: Du contrat social (first published 
1762)]. 
 84 For a more measured, modern variant see, eg, Robert C Post, Constitutional Domains: 
Democracy, Community, Management (Harvard University Press, 1995) 311–12. 
 85 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University 
Press, 1980). 
 86 Ibid 73–104. 
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passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them.’87 Indeed, deliberative rationality is a tool for the effective implementation 
of subjective, non-rational voter preferences. For example, if voters favoured it, 
the creation of an independent head of state to express Australian nationhood 
would be neither a rational nor irrational preference. However, the complex task 
of constitutional drafting and implementation would require a well-informed, 
deliberative process to help give practical effect to the choice. 
Harder cases nevertheless arise where public preferences conflict. How can 
deliberative democracy express inconsistent public intentions? Sometimes even 
the same sets of voters hold contradictory views. For instance, polls in Australia 
consistently show strong public support for both the propositions that taxes 
should be lower and that government should invest in and do more.88 One 
answer offered by deliberative democrats is that deliberative democratic process 
better informs public participants about the complexities of both the short- and 
long-term consequences of policy. As a result, it can encourage participants to 
understand how preferences relate to each other as coherent wholes, and to avoid 
unrealistic preferences.89 
Finally, cooperative rather than competitive and polarised decision-making 
more readily allows public preferences to gain expression in the first place. 
When elaborate policy details must fit within a competitive model’s artificially 
few poles of debate, this focus on competition does not reflect the complex array 
of existing public preferences. Instead, it channels and recasts public preferences 
in its own limited terms. The irony of apparently unfettered, but highly polarised, 
democracy is that it is often severely hobbled by its own narrow scope of 
democratic representation. 
3 Public Participation 
While any preparatory system for referenda will tend to feature widespread 
public consultation, improved deliberation can increase the relative strength of 
public voices. Deliberatively rational discourse should give less preference to the 
preformed and polarised expressions of powerful speakers, such as elected 
representatives.90 Cogent information or argument ideally then become the main 
currencies of decision-making, with the result that varied contributions to the 
process, whether lay, expert or party-political, rest approximately on equal 
footing regardless of origin. Interviews and observations of CA members for this 
 
 87 Hume, above n 41, 266. 
 88 Katherine Gregory and David Hetherington describe support for lowering tax (60 per cent) and 
raising spending (79 per cent) as evidence of ‘stark cognitive dissonance’: Katherine Gregory 
and David Hetherington, Per Capita Tax Survey: Public Attitudes towards Taxation and 
Government Expenditure (2010) 3–5, 15. 
 89 To be sure, Arrow and his followers show that inconsistency among social preferences remains to 
some extent inescapable: see Arrow, above n 15. 
 90 Past studies indicate that without clear partisan positions to look to in a referendum, voters turn 
to wide media and other resources to inform themselves and reason about the issues: see Shaun 
Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting and Direct Democracy 
(University of Michigan Press, 1998) 55–65. 
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work and others suggest that the bodies gave prominence to contributions of CA 
members and of participants in wider public consultations.91 
To explain the causes of improved deliberation, Warren and Pearse place some 
emphasis on the British Columbian CA’s explicit early establishment of shared 
values such as ‘listening, open-mindedness, respect [and] clear communica-
tion’.92 But self-conscious efforts such as these may be less important than 
indirect ways in which CAs improve deliberation. Deliberative procedures 
channel and orchestrate the interactions of decision-makers.93 It is a relatively 
simple matter to determine where the emphasis of debate and discussion should 
lie by arranging who should be involved, with whom they should interact, at 
what time and for how long. This may bring different, or in Dryzek’s term ‘more 
democratic’,94 arrays of decision-makers into contact. There are at least three 
variations on these themes. First, elevating randomly selected citizens to pre-
eminent positions in the decision-making process establishes, both symbolically 
and in real terms, that reasoning through the issues from first principles is the 
primary function of deliberations. Citizen-members are political neophytes. They 
rarely have strong party affiliations and, in deliberating, tend to avoid falling into 
the preset discourses that often encumber debates among political professionals. 
Indeed, members of the British Columbian CA were ‘insulated’ from outside 
(including party-political) influence; most sessions were held in camera.95 
Second, decision-making processes can bring the contributions of academic and 
other experts to the fore, again highlighting and giving a concrete role to cogent 
reasoning as the central concern of decision-making.96 Third, however, the array 
of contributions and interactions in a deliberative process is ideally widely 
diversified — yielding deliberations that are reasoned and informative, but 
ambiguous as a whole as a result of their extensive complexity. Maintaining 
ideological or party-political polarisation becomes more difficult against the 
background of multiple ideological and factional polarities.97  
 
 91 See the interviews cited in above n 13. Pearse observes that the British Columbia CA filtered 
extensive submissions for cogency and deliberated based on a picture of the ‘political values [of] 
… British Columbians’ revealed in consultations: Pearse, above n 17, 79–81 (emphasis in 
original). 
 92 Warren and Pearse, ‘Introduction’, above n 12, 11. On other process features affecting the 
deliberation of CAs, see eg, Thompson, above n 16. 
 93 Pearse, above n 17, 71. 
 94 According to Dryzek, bringing varied decision-makers into contact allows the contradictory 
discourses favoured by each (for example, entrenched neoliberal or environmental perspectives) 
to challenge and modify each other: John S Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and 
Democracy in a Divided World (Polity, 2006) 25. 
 95 Warren and Pearse, ‘Introduction’, above n 12, 11. In camera sessions raise familiar tensions 
between impartiality and accountability. To be sure, however, consultations and referenda 
enabled public review at other stages. 
 96 On asserted political bias among the academic class, however, see eg, John O McGinnis, 
‘Against the Scribes: Campaign Finance Reform Revisited’ (2000) 24 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 25, 28. 
 97 I develop this notion in Ron Levy, ‘Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the 
Administrative Arena’ (2008) 53 McGill Law Journal 1, 42. 
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D  The Challenge of Egalitarian Democracy 
It was once a largely uncontested article of faith among political and social 
scholars that a distinctively egalitarian democracy prevails in relatively classless 
Australia. This faith is now more often rendered with greater nuance and 
attention to exceptions. Yet what is still clear is that a formidable egalitarian 
streak runs through Australian democratic practice.98 One reason why referenda 
have failed so often is that voters do not trust their political ‘betters’ to initiate 
change;99 many assume there can be no better or higher authority than one’s own 
native instinct and rational capacity. De Tocqueville’s observations in 1840 about 
American democratic participants could apply as well to modern day Austra-
lians: 
[With] citizens, placed on equal footing … no signs of incontestable greatness 
or superiority are perceived in any one of them [and] they are constantly 
brought back to their own reason as the most obvious and proximate source of 
truth. It is not only the confidence in this or that man which is destroyed, but 
the disposition to trust the authority of any man whatsoever. Everyone shuts 
himself up tightly within himself and insists upon judging the world from 
there.100 
Australian voter trust in constitutional amendment is indeed limited because, 
more generally, trust in political elites is limited. Why trust another to make 
decisions for me when I can trust myself? 
The key question that such populist anti-elitism poses for deliberative democ-
racy is whether a process of constitutional change, led not by political profes-
sionals but by voters themselves, may have a better chance at success. Trust in 
citizen-led change may then be higher than trust in the status quo approach to 
preparing changes. More trust in a process in turn may translate into greater 
receptivity to change. The key may be avoiding legislation imposed from on 
high; top-down approaches have previously attracted distrust and frustrated 
attempts at change. If voters trusted the lead up to referenda more than they 
currently do, would they be more inclined to give their support to changes even 
if — as is inevitably the case — many do not understand the question or its 
implications?  
Not just any citizen-led process will work: constitutional amendment presents 
the puzzle of designing a process to avoid imposing change from above while 
remaining appropriately deliberative. Internationally, and particularly in the 
American state systems, a common alternative is the citizen-initiated referendum 
triggered by voter petitions. Twenty-four American states employ this populist 
technique.101 The option was mooted and dropped during the Australian referen-
 
 98 See Winterton, above n 7, 31. 
 99 Williams, above n 6, 17–18; John Higley and Rhonda Evans Case, ‘Australia: The Politics of 
Becoming a Republic’ (2000) 11 Journal of Democracy 136, 138, 147; Irving, above n 7; 
Tranter, above n 14, 686, 696. 
100 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve trans, Alfred A Knopf, 1945) vol 2, 
4 [trans of: De la démocratie en Amérique (first published 1840)]. 
101 Gildersleeve, above n 82, 1450. 
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dum round of 1988.102 The democratic pathologies of citizen-initiated referenda 
are well-described elsewhere.103 Most concerning are the tendencies of citizen-
initiated referenda to target minorities invidiously, and to impose unworkable 
requirements on governance, such as Proposition 13, the infamous 1978 Califor-
nian interdiction against raising property taxes, which may have helped drive the 
state close to collapse during the recent financial crisis.104 Even in normal 
economic times, from inside its citizen-initiated economic straightjacket, 
California has been all but ungovernable.105 This case illustrates the flipside of 
the various rationales noted above in favour of deliberatively rational decision-
making. Citizen-initiated referenda make little provision for fairness or for the 
holistic, well-informed approaches to policy-making that are the concern of 
deliberative democracy. 
The CAs in Canada were indeed more deliberative. Citizens selected to sit on 
the CAs became experts in the constitutional issues they addressed. Neverthe-
less, like any institution, the CAs were far from perfect. At least three conceptual 
and practical problems arose then, and would arise again in the future should 
Australia adopt this approach. 
First, is the notion of the public-expert paradoxical, or perhaps merely an 
empty symbol or sleight of hand? In Australia, conventions now prepare 
changes, with some public consultation. However, the parliamentary role has 
remained paramount, as the Prime Minister and a handful of others have tended 
to finalise referendum questions.106 The public-expert of the CA is perhaps 
different because he or she is not a professional. What makes the public-expert 
‘public’ is his or her political neophyte status at the outset of deliberations.107 Yet 
members of the public brought into a process of deliberation over several months 
arguably are still insiders, like the professional politicians they replaced. As 
Thompson points out, CA members ‘began as ordinary citizens but ended as 
nascent experts’, opening up a ‘moral gap’ between members and other citi-
 
102 Constitution Alteration (Electors’ Initiative) Bill 1987 (Cth), requiring a petition representing 5 
per cent of electors (or approximately 500 000 nationwide signatures). See also the more recent 
Constitution Alteration (Electors’ Initiative, Fixed Term Parliaments and Qualification of 
Members) Bill 2000 (Cth) sch 1. 
103 See, eg, Zoltan L Hajnal, Elisabeth R Gerber and Hugh Louch, ‘Minorities and Direct 
Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections’ (2002) 64 Journal of 
Politics 154; Helen Gregorczuk, ‘Citizen Initiated Referendums: Republican Innovation or 
Scourge of Representative Democracy?’ (1998) 7 Griffith Law Review 249. 
104 California Constitution art XIIIA §§ 1–6. See, eg, Colin H McCubbins and 
Mathew D McCubbins, ‘Proposition 13 and the California Fiscal Shell Game’ (2010) 2(2) 
California Journal of Politics & Policy 1; Kevin O’Leary, ‘How California’s Fiscal Woes Began: 
A Crisis 30 Years in the Making’, Time (online) 1 July 2009 
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1907504, 
00.html>. 
105 Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (New Press, 1998) 129–
87. 
106 Saunders, above n 4, 23–4. 
107 Members also have no vested interest in deliberation outcomes. This independence is not unique, 
but can be greater than for independent commissions, where the risk of partisan appointment is 
higher. 
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zens.108 However, CAs may yet answer some of the more pressing concerns of 
populist critics of the status quo. Among the more entrenched expectations of the 
populist tradition is that, as a solution to the corrupting influence of power, 
government should perpetually turn over, bringing in outsiders still in touch with 
the concerns of regular people.109 CA members are indeed fresh, and at first 
unprofessionalised, entrants into the system. There is arguably still cause to trust 
their motives for promoting particular constitutional changes, at least for a time, 
before they themselves become accustomed to power. Indeed, the CAs’ uniniti-
ated, politically untarnished and demographically representative citizen members 
tend to encourage average voters to identify with CAs, reasoning that members 
are ‘just like me’.110 Choosing participants by citizen lottery means that every 
voter knows that he or she might have sat on the CA, or could sit on the next. 
CAs thus have the potential to narrow the gap that voters perceive between 
themselves and the process of constitutional amendment.111 
A second potential critique stems from the CAs’ stratified method of random 
selection, which makes the bodies approximately representative of demographic 
groups such as female, aboriginal and regional voters. Such identity-based 
representation departs from traditional democratic approaches, which principally 
represent geographic regions.112 The traditional model’s weakness is often its 
majoritarianism, which can ignore or actively work against the interests of 
minority identity groups in a district.113 Yet just as inevitably, parliamentary 
systems premised on identitarian representation descend into insoluble questions 
about which groups should be represented, and how indeed to represent various 
groups, whether large or small, discrete or overlapping, on an assembly of 
perhaps 160 people.114 In democratic terms alone, there may therefore be no 
clear resolution to this tension between forms of representation, making it a 
classic dilemma of conflicting values of democratic design.115 The choice among 
models should perhaps turn instead on their other costs and benefits — including 
potential effects on public trust. 
A third problem is getting the size of a deliberative assembly right. The larger 
the body, the more representative it may appear to be, yet genuine deliberation 
becomes more difficult with increasing size.116 The American caucus system 
 
108 Thompson, above n 16, 47. 
109 See, eg, Margaret Canovan, ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’ 
(1999) 47 Political Studies 2. 
110 Cutler et al, above n 14, 166–91. 
111 Thompson, above n 16, 47. 
112 They may also incidentally try to represent the variety of other identity groups within their 
electorates; clearly, then, the two categories of representation are not wholly distinct. 
113 Alexis de Tocqueville was one of many to make this observation: de Tocqueville, above n 100, 
261, 411. See also Spector, above n 76, 120. 
114 See, eg, Françoise Gaspard, ‘The French Parity Movement’ in Jytte Klausen and Charles S Maier 
(eds), Has Liberalism Failed Women? Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United 
States (Palgrave, 2001) 64. 
115 See above n 15 and accompanying text. 
116 John Ferejohn, ‘Instituting Deliberative Democracy’ in Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo (eds), 
Designing Democratic Institutions (New York University Press, 2000) 75, 82–7. 
     
828 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 34 
 
     
illustrates this tension. During election years, some states convene caucuses to 
choose candidates who will run for state or national office under a particular 
party banner. In some cases the participants involved number over four per cent 
of all state voters117 — in comparison with, for example, the British Columbian 
CA’s 160 members out of a provincial voter base of 2.6 million.118 A drawback 
of caucuses, however, is that their deliberative content is limited by their large 
size. Supporters of various candidates typically stand together at discrete points 
in assembly halls, trading positions only as candidates drop out of the race 
during successive ballots.119 Debate is limited. Candidate supporters generally 
come bearing pre-formed partisan positions. The system may then be attractive 
for its relative inclusiveness, but not for meaningful cooperative deliberation. 
The importance of having a large body is therefore questionable. Indeed, as its 
relatively impressive referendum outcome suggests, the British Columbian CA 
attracted wide public trust despite its small size. 
In sum, applying the CA model is not a straightforward matter. The model 
raises complexities, and indeed the exact form it should take is subject to some 
variation. Even in the two Canadian Provinces in which CAs have run thus far, 
the bodies differed in size, methods of public education and involvement, and 
political–cultural contexts. The unvarying characteristic of the CAs, however, 
was their use of voters themselves as middlemen charged with investigating, 
preparing and presenting the case for change. Deliberative democratic innova-
tions may not be the only means of addressing the tensions of democratic 
institutional design. But, as accommodative systems able to resolve and diminish 
these tensions, they may be the most suitable for Australia, particularly in light of 
the serious impediments to constitutional change posed by an (otherwise 
salutary) egalitarian national democratic culture. 
A question that remains open, however, is whether the theoretical points can-
vassed in this Part are also reflected in subjective public perceptions of the 
legitimacy of constitutional change. In the following Parts, I therefore offer 
empirical complements to the preceding theory. The discussion also turns from 
foreign cases to the Australian case. I first introduce the polling study conducted 
for this article with a discussion of its main variable: trust. I then detail the poll’s 
intriguing findings, which offer evidence that deliberative democracy is an 
emerging social expectation, and even perhaps a prerequisite for successful 
constitutional change in Australia. 
 
117 Richard L Hasen, ‘“Too Plain for Argument?” The Uncertain Congressional Power to Require 
Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees through Direct and Equal Primaries’ (2008) 102 
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 253, 257. 
118 Elections BC, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the 38th Provincial General Election and 
2005 Referendum on Electoral Reform (2005) 14. 
119 Lonna Rae Atkeson and Cherie D Maestas, ‘Meaningful Participation and the Evolution of the 
Reformed Presidential Nominating System’ (2009) 42 Political Science & Politics 59, 60. 
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I I I   LE G I T I M A C Y T H R O U G H  T H E  LE N S  O F  TR U S T 
A  Measuring Trust 
The theories above suggest that deliberative democratic constitutional change 
is as democratically legitimate as traditional options: as an accommodative form 
of democratic design, it is appealing for its capacity to avoid trade-offs between 
democratic values. Yet the idea of legitimacy entails, at least in part, a public’s 
subjective confidence in authority. Any theory of democratic legitimacy should 
account for public intuitions about the nature of legitimacy. 
In this Part, I introduce the distinctive public trust angle on questions of le-
gitimacy and constitutional change posed in the polling study. The poll inquires 
about legitimacy by an indirect route, using public trust as the main unit of 
measurement. As yet, few authors have read constitutions and constitutional 
change in depth using the complex and burgeoning interdisciplinary literature on 
public trust in governance. Yet trust is a powerful analytic lens in this context. 
Trust is defined in much the same way in both lay and academic understandings: 
by trusting, one person invests power over herself in another person, expecting 
the power to be exercised in salutary ways. Trust therefore has an objective facet 
(the act of investing power) and a subjective facet (belief that the investment is 
justified). From basic definitions such as these, sociologists, philosophers and 
political scientists have explored the concept’s many additional aspects and 
implications.120 But because trust remains a term whose basic usage is the same 
in the public and scholarly domains, it is not the exclusive preserve of political 
theory or any other singular context. Trust is therefore a helpful frame of 
reference for theorising democratic legitimacy. In contrast to legitimacy, less 
linguistic baggage attaches to trust and so it does not presuppose a particular 
model of legitimacy. Reasoning in terms of trust permits us to reconsider 
legitimacy through a wider lens, relatively unclouded by presupposition (for 
example, about the greater legitimacy of either laissez-faire or deliberative 
democratic constitutional change). 
Moreover, trust can serve as a bridging language between theory and empirical 
inquiry; by examining trust, we can check hypotheses about legitimacy using a 
simple and broadly cognisable unit of empirical measurement. Because defini-
tions of trust are tightly anchored to human intuition, the language of trust is 
valuable for gauging public perceptions of an otherwise arcane and multivalent 
concept such as legitimacy. 
Perhaps most importantly, using the language of trust to bridge theory and 
empirical inquiry also allows debates about institutional design to draw on 
impressive existing literatures on trust, including troves of historical data. A key 
trend in more than four decades of polling has been the hardening of public 
views about the trustworthiness of governments in liberal democracies.121 The 
 
120 See, eg, above nn 5, 8 and 14. 
121 See A J Brown, Australian Constitutional Values Survey 2010: Results Release 1 (2010) (‘Results 
Release 1 Report’). See also, McAllister and Clark, above n 8, 25. 
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implications for constitutional change are considerable, though little effort has 
been made to understand or address them as problems of trust. Declining trust 
since the 1960s is chiefly a consequence of changing social attitudes.122 For 
example, there is little evidence of greater corruption in public office; what 
appear to have changed are social expectations — about government, the role of 
the citizen and the citizen’s proper quantum of respect for authority.123 Such 
broad changes in subjective trust could not have been foreseen at the advent of 
the constitutional referendum mechanism in 1901. Section 128 of the Constitu-
tion on its face expresses the expectation that Australians would, at least from 
time to time, be sufficiently credulous in their attitudes toward political elites to 
vote for reforms.124 But subjective decline also drags down objective trust: in 
most liberal democracies, citizens are now more miserly when bestowing powers 
on elites. Viewed in light of data indicating trust’s long descent, Australians’ 
unwillingness to give their assent in constitutional referenda appears both 
unsurprising and unlikely to reverse under the institutional status quo. 
B  Norms of Constitutional Change 
Declining trustworthiness, then, is in the eye of the voter: government has not 
significantly changed, but subjective public attitudes about government have. Yet 
the consequences of the decline for successful constitutional reform are real. As 
Saunders notes, a ‘[c]onstitution alteration procedure does not operate in a 
vacuum’;125 among other factors, it ‘is affected by political culture. … Norma-
tive limits are imposed by considerations of democracy, Australian-style.’126 
Though no formal judge writes such norms and remedies their breach, some 
norms present powerful implicit constraints on governments. A government 
hoping to change the Constitution must abide by basic rules enforced exclusively 
by social sanction. The place of such norms is clearest under s 128 of the 
Constitution, where the final judges are electors themselves. But how can we 
gauge the socially normative conditions for successful constitutional change if it 
so seldom occurs? Detailed speculation as to changes that might succeed must 
rest on what is known empirically about evolving public expectations of gov-
ernment, including perceptions of public trust. In this light, at least two key 
expectations appear to be emerging. 
1 Democratic Norms 
The first and clearest norm is a requirement of public consent. As Uhr notes, 
governments ‘may not be capable of restraining [the] … popular tide of interest 
 
122 Ronald Inglehart, ‘Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority’ in 
Joseph S Nye Jr, Philip D Zelikow and David C King (eds), Why People Don’t Trust Government 
(Harvard University Press, 1997) 217, 218. 
123 See Ibid 217–52. 
124 Indeed, most of ‘the framers expected that the Australian Constitution would be less rigid than 
the Constitution of the United States’: Saunders, above n 4, ii. 
125 Ibid 2, 28. 
126 Ibid. 
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in greater participation in government decision-making.’127 This includes 
participation in constitutional change. The overarching lesson from post-1960s 
data on trust is that voters will resist investing power in any authority above 
themselves.128 Too little consultation and too little trust in the preparation for 
referenda may predetermine unsuccessful votes. In the recent past, proposed 
changes emerged from a preparatory process whose main democratic content 
was the party-political conflict of elected representatives, and relatively brief, 
non-binding public consultations that had vaguely and unsatisfactorily defined 
influence on the shape of proposed changes.129 
A norm of public consent to constitutional reform is now established in many 
liberal democratic societies. In Canada, for example, three successive attempts to 
change the federal Constitution while including the hold-out Province of Quebec 
saw increasing public consultation: from the minimalist parliamentary committee 
hearings of the late 1970s to a nationwide referendum in 1992. Major constitu-
tional changes in Canada now informally require public consent by referen-
dum.130 On the other hand, the two most recent Canadian constitutional reform 
attempts faltered outright, despite the political investments of a wide spectrum of 
elected leaders. As in Australia, consultation by referendum has not guaranteed 
public assent.131 Greater attention must be given to whether the preparations for 
referenda enjoy trust and perceptions of legitimacy, which make positive 
referendum results more likely.132 The dominant institutional approaches still 
common in Australia sometimes evince little awareness that liberal democratic 
publics have lost the willingness to go along with the prescriptions of their 
presumptive political betters. 
2 Deliberative Democratic Norms 
The deliberative democratic theories detailed above indicate that democratic 
legitimacy is a more complex matter than simply securing public consent. A rule 
of public consent is significant but under-informative on its own. Concretely, 
 
127 Uhr, above n 54, 879. See also ibid 7. 
128 See, eg, Warren and Pearse, ‘Introduction’, above n 12, 2. 
129 Saunders notes that the ‘ambiguity of [the Republic Convention’s] … relationship with both the 
Parliament and the voters ultimately was reflected in the quality and acceptability of the 
[referendum] proposal’: Saunders, above n 4, ii. In addition, Uhr believes that the ‘Convention 
fell quite short of the “People’s Convention” as originally proposed by John Howard when leader 
of the opposition’, therefore missing its potential to be a model for deliberative democracy in 
Australia: Uhr, above n 54, 877. According to Williams, a meaningful public process must at 
least last longer: Williams, above n 6, 18. Indeed, in contrast with the Canadian CAs’ 11 months 
of deliberation, the Republic Convention lasted only 10 days. 
130 See Sujit Choudhry, ‘Bills of Rights as Instruments of Nation-Building in Multinational States: 
The Canadian Charter and Quebec Nationalism’ in James B Kelly and Christopher P Manfredi 
(eds), Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (UBC Press, 2009) 233. 
131 The first Canadian attempt passed and gave rise to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B 
(‘Constitution Act 1982’) (including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), but did not 
have the consent of Quebec: see Gil Remillard, ‘The Constitution Act, 1982: An Unfinished 
Compromise’ (1984) 32 American Journal of Comparative Law 269, 269; David R Cameron and 
Jacqueline D Krikorian, ‘Recognizing Quebec in the Constitution of Canada: Using the Bilateral 
Constitutional Amendment Process’ (2008) 58 University of Toronto Law Journal 389, 391. 
132 See Tranter, above n 14, 686–7. 
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institutions can take at least two more particular directions, each of which may 
gain cultural acceptance to greater or lesser degrees in Australia as compared 
with other jurisdictions.133 The first is again laissez-faire, leaving power rela-
tively unmediated as a formal matter.134 Here minimal institutional and legal 
interference comes between voters and their expressions of will regarding 
constitutional change. Citizen-initiated referenda are paradigmatic laissez-faire 
solutions, which steer clear of objective acts of trust investing power in institu-
tions. The laissez-faire model appears at least superficially suited to Australian 
democracy and its egalitarian flavour. However, a second option is deliberative 
citizen-led constitutional change. This institutional path differs from that of 
many states of the United States. The decision-making of CAs is elaborately 
structured to mediate change and improve deliberation. Yet like laissez-faire 
models, CAs avoid elite control from above, leaving the task of mediation to 
citizens themselves. 
Democracy structured to accommodate deliberative values may be a public 
expectation approximately as important as public consent. This hypothesis 
assumes that Australian political culture is multifaceted and not merely egalitar-
ian. For example, the Australian public’s embrace of exacting legal regulation in 
many aspects of private and public life is also a prominent cultural feature. The 
potential for dysfunction associated with unmediated democracy may not be lost 
on Australians, who are presumably wary of unchecked change or of leaving 
decision-making to the vagaries of other citizens’ whims and preferences. More 
particularly, voters may recognise that, because constitutional change is com-
plex, a full understanding of its implications is beyond their own competence. 
Investing trust in experts is then necessary. Nevertheless, democratic norms still 
suggest that the expert role must be handled by voters themselves. 
Deliberative democratic institutions may succeed in juggling these diverse and 
otherwise contradictory conditions. The hypothesis tested in the following Part is 
that electors themselves impose conditions of fairness, information and majori-
tarian democracy on constitutional change and that, in contrast with traditional 
models, deliberative democratic constitutional change can attract significant trust 
by accommodating each of these conditions. 
IV  AU S T R A L I A N  PO L L I N G  ST U D Y O N  TR U S T A N D  CO N S T I T U T I O N A L 
CH A N G E 
The survey of attitudes toward federal constitutional change presented detailed 
questions to 1100 voting-age respondents throughout Australia.135 In order to 
 
133 In the United States, while trust in traditional representative democracy has declined since the 
1960s, the popularity of citizen-initiated referenda has risen: David S Broder, Democracy 
Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money (Harcourt, 2000) 208–9. 
134 See, eg, Spector, above n 76, 113, where the author identifies public rights to unmediated 
democracy in the related context of constitutional adjudication by ‘citizen juries’. 
135 550 males and 550 females widely distributed throughout the country participated in a Newspoll 
telephone survey between 1–14 March 2010. The survey was part of the larger, periodic 
Australian Constitutional Values Survey, the other parts of which, led by Professor A J Brown, 
investigated attitudes toward subjects including Australian federalism and its reform: Results 
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decouple questions about the process of constitutional change from any particu-
lar reform movement, a key aim was to present options in general and hypotheti-
cal terms, rather than as means to a particular substantive end. However, in a 
complex poll such as this, some initial context-building touching on substance 
was necessary. Potential areas of change were introduced in an opening series of 
questions about the reforms that respondents would consider to be important 
enough to submit to referendum ‘in the next few years’. The possibilities were 
diverse: whether ‘Australia should become a Republic’; whether ‘to recognise 
the history and culture of Indigenous Australians in the Constitution’; ‘what 
levels of government Australia should have’; and ‘which level of government is 
responsible for doing what’.136 
After these preliminaries the poll turned to the main questions. The first of 
these were about the values that should inform constitutional change. Questions 
about values were designed to yield detailed insights into what kind of reform 
process electors would trust. As noted previously, in an area such as constitu-
tional change, where the people have the last word under s 128 and trust is 
generally in short supply, questions about how reforms gain public trust cannot 
be avoided. To the extent they are neglected, these norms pose barriers to 
constitutional change. 
The value options presented in the poll were those examined above: majori-
tarian democracy, fairness and well-informed process. The lacuna in empirical 
scholarship on what is necessary, by popular expectation, for constitutional 
change to take place has been noted.137 Policymakers and some commentators 
have often assumed the answer is more majoritarian democracy: that the ability 
of a process to discern and give voice to dominant public sentiment is the acid 
test of democratic legitimacy for constitutional change.138 But as set out above, 
there are reasons why fairness and adequate information must also play roles. 
Before the present work was conducted, an open question remained whether 
processes making no provision for these deliberative values would attract 
significant trust. 
The poll asked respondents to rank which values are ‘most important’, ‘next 
most important’ and ‘least important’ to the ‘process of writing the proposed 
change, and the arguments for and against it’. (Since electors as a whole must 
give their final assent by referendum to proposed reforms, for accuracy, stress 
was placed on what values should inform processes for preparing referenda.) 
 
Release 1 Report, above n 121; A J Brown and Ron Levy, Australian Constitutional Values 
Survey 2010: Results Release 2 (2010). 
136 In a parallel work in development, A J Brown and I present and analyse the intriguing results of 
this line of questions: ‘The New Referendum Landscape: Local Government and Indigenous 
Recognition Reform in Australia’. 
137 See above Part I. 
138 See, eg, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European 
Constitutional Project?’ (2006) 47 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 219, which discusses 
unsuccessful initiatives to use referenda to secure public support for European constitutional 
change; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 June 1995, 1625 
(John Howard) (‘there cannot be too much democracy’); Choudhry, above n 130, 233. 
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These questions are key to understanding what voters themselves take to be 
democratically legitimate constitutional change. 
A  Figure 1: Values of Reform 
The poll showed substantial primary support for ‘impartiality and fairness’139 
— which received, at 54.0 per cent, more first-choice preferences than the other 
two options combined. This result casts doubt on assumptions about the pre-
eminence or sufficiency of majoritarianism. Fairness — an element of delibera-
tively rational decision-making — is also clearly a relevant factor, and on the 
evidence a more important one. Unsurprisingly, the results do not discount the 
importance of giving voice to democratic majorities. That value attracts reasona-
bly strong support over the first and second choices of respondents. Slightly 
shallower importance was ascribed to well-informed process, the other aspect of 
deliberatively rational change. Even so, 20.1 per cent of respondents ranked 
well-informed process first (just below the 24.3 per cent who favoured majori-
tarian democracy first), and its second choices were approximately equal in 
frequency to second choices recorded for other values. 
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At the broadest level these results illustrate that not one but three values are 
viewed as substantially important. Majoritarian democracy should not be 
assumed to be the primary factor lending legitimacy to constitutional change. A 
corollary may be that this value is insufficient for generating trusted constitu-
tional change on its own. Indeed, by a wide margin, fairness in a process of 
constitutional change is the value most clearly required. 
Following this groundwork on values of constitutional change, further ques-
tions examined support for a new CA-inspired body for Australia, styled a 
 
139 In some cases, terms such as fairness and trust were paired with related words (eg, impartiality 
and confidence) in order to minimise the risk of respondents misunderstanding the meaning of 
the question. 
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‘People’s Assembly’.140 The questions indicated that the body would be empow-
ered to deliberate over and propose constitutional changes, and to lead the 
campaign for their implementation, but would leave final judgment to the full 
electorate.141 The questions compared whether this deliberative democratic 
innovation would command more or less trust than the mainly parliamentary 
approach of the status quo. However, as noted previously, questions about how 
exactly people do or do not trust particular procedures to secure constitutional 
change can be more useful than questions premised on less defined notions of 
trust. In these questions, then, in order to determine why the two models at-
tracted particular levels of trust overall, questions tying trust to the three specific 
constitutional change values were asked first. On a 10-point scale, respondents 
indicated ‘how much trust and confidence’ they would have, in terms of the three 
values, in either a People’s Assembly or the parliamentary model to lead change. 
B  Figure 2: Three Dimensions of Trust: Reform Led by Parliament versus  
People’s Assembly  
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The average scores given by respondents to the People’s Assembly were 
notably higher overall than those for the parliamentary model. But these results 
more importantly disclose intriguing comparisons among scores for trust in 
relation to particular values. The parliamentary model attracted relatively low 
trust for fairness and majority voice, but higher trust as a well-informed process. 
The People’s Assembly yielded mirror-image results: lower trust as a well-
 
140 The rhetoric of ‘citizen’ may have less purchase in Australia than in Canada. We also avoided 
‘Citizens’ Parliament’, using the more prosaic ‘Assembly’, as befits an impermanent body. 
141 The explanation read: 
A People’s Assembly would be a random cross-section of about 500 voters. Over several 
months, they would be informed by experts about constitutional matters, and at the end, those 
500 people would write the proposed change to the Constitution, and the arguments for and 
against it. After that, the whole public would still vote in a referendum, just like the current 
system. 
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informed process, and higher scores for fairness and majority voice. The 
suggestion that emerges is that deliberative democratic forms of government are 
not only viewed as more deliberatively rational than traditional representative 
democracy, but also more sensitive to majority interests — apparently trumping 
traditional democracy in what might be assumed its area of strength. Australians 
as a whole would appear to agree with researchers who defend deliberative 
democracy as both more deliberative and more democratically legitimate. On the 
other hand, in terms of the other main deliberative value, the parliamentary 
model is understood as better-informed.142 
The results additionally provide insight into why people trust the different 
models. A final group of outcomes, shown below, indicate substantially higher 
overall trust in the new deliberative democratic People’s Assembly model as 
compared with the status quo. However, that stark overall result tells us little, on 
its own, about why Australians would prefer a People’s Assembly. Overall 
perceptions of trust mask the roles of more specific values. We saw above that 
the parliamentary model attracts more trust for its sensitivity to constitutional 
information, while for a People’s Assembly trust would be stronger in respect of 
fairness and majority voice. Neither model therefore enjoys greater trust across 
the board. However, from the groundwork questions on values we also know that 
respondents consider fairness and majority voice to be highest in importance. In 
a People’s Assembly, then, there is a confluence of high-importance and high-
trust values. Because the values with which a People’s Assembly is associated 
are those generally thought to be the most important, overall trust should be 
higher as against the traditional model. The final set of responses, showing a 
People’s Assembly favoured by nearly 2:1 among respondents who stated a 
preference, confirms this prediction. 
 
142 Results Release 1 Report, above n 121, 11. Cutler et al, above n 14, 175, asked a similar question 
in British Columbia, albeit in respect of a real rather than hypothetical CA and without similar 
groundwork questions on value importance. A majority of respondents entered ‘don’t know’ 
responses, yet among those who answered, a pattern approximately similar to the present poll 
emerged: respondents agreed that the CA was fair (by ratios of 2:1 and 4:1, citing lack of bias 
and openness to all views, respectively); represented the whole Province (3:1); and was expert 
(1.5:1). 
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C  Figure 3: Overall Trust in Two Constitutional Change Models 
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Australians appear to be willing to experiment with deliberative democracy — 
a result belying assumptions that the national posture toward constitutional 
change is a naturally conservative one. Australians may previously have opposed 
changes in significant part because the changes were proposed in democratically 
deficient ways. In the poll, the People’s Assembly attracted more trust by a 
notable 17.2 percentage points. It may be significant that, in just over half of all 
Australian federal referenda held to date, the difference in percentages between 
votes cast for and against referendum proposals has been less than 10.0 points.143 
Of course, we cannot directly translate relative trust in a process of reform into a 
presumed outcome for either the ‘yes’ or the ‘no’ side of a referendum. Such a 
connection cannot be assessed in hypothetical terms; despite a well-trusted 
referendum process, voters might disapprove a change for its substance. How-
ever, if increased trust on this scale held in a referendum, the effect on voting 
could be substantial, particularly among electors under-informed about the case 
for constitutional change and otherwise distrustful of political elites asking for 
their support. 
V  CO N C L U S I O N 
This article aimed to bring scholarship on trust into legal discourses of consti-
tutional amendment. Trust is one of the chief intangibles that determine the 
effectiveness of governance. Yet among Australian voters there is a hardening 
resistance toward trusting any authority other than one’s own. For the Common-
wealth to restart stalled processes of constitutional change, it will be necessary to 
master the difficult terrain of generating public trust in the lead up to referenda in 
spite of generally worsening conditions. The poll conducted for this article 
 
143 Department of Parliamentary Services, Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of 
Australia 2008 (Parliamentary Library, 31st ed, 2008) 386–409. 
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provided information about points where public values converge on questions of 
trust in governance. In this way, the article began a project of characterising the 
public expectations that constrain constitutional practice, determining whether 
and when trust develops to enable governments to achieve ends such as constitu-
tional reform. In addition to the unsurprising public focus on majoritarian 
democratic legitimacy, constitutional change notably must substantially fulfil 
deliberative democratic values. The poll showed that Australians do not wish to 
see their democracy, in the lead up to referenda, focused on the relatively coarse 
majoritarianism of the parliamentary model. 
To be sure, these innovations call for more Australian research and elaboration, 
for example on their potential scope of application in Australia, on the challenges 
of introducing CAs into substantially polarised settings,144 and on optimal ways 
of designing the CAs’ engagement with the wider public.145 However, in broad 
terms initially, the poll results indicated strong value preferences for deliberative 
democracy in Australia, which, though less majoritarian, is the majority’s 
preference. This clarified why a second and more concrete result showed 
Australians more likely to embrace the alternative of a People’s Assembly, 
designed on the CA model of deliberative democracy. There is an apparent 
willingness to invest power in and to trust an assembly of citizen peers if doing 
so helps to moderate the excesses of majoritarianism without involving dis-
trusted elites. By accommodating deliberatively rational and majoritarian 
democratic values, a well-funded, well-publicised and carefully designed 
People’s Assembly in Australia might bring substantially greater public trust to 
the process of constitutional reform. 
 
144 The abortive attempt to introduce CAs in 2010 was considerably hamstrung by its introduction as 
an element in a party platform during federal election campaigning. Newer constitutional 
initiatives announced late in 2010 appear set to follow a more considered course and may 
incorporate at least some deliberative features. 
145 I elaborate on these further debates over the uses of CAs in Australia in Ron Levy, ‘Deliberative 
Constitutional Change in a Polarised Federation’ in Paul Kildea, Andrew Lynch and George 
Williams (eds), Tomorrow’s Federation (Federation Press, 2012) (forthcoming). 
